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Migration and Remittances in Kazakhstan: First Evidence from a Household Survey

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Abstract

Internal migration flows in Kazakhstan are of high social and political relevance but political and public attention has primarily been devoted to external movements. This paper presents the main descriptive results of a new household survey on migration and remittances in Kazakhstan which was conducted in four cities (Almaty, Astana, Karaganda and Pavlodar) between October and December 2010. It summarizes the survey's methodology, gives an overview over the basic characteristics of respondents, illustrates migration experiences on the individual and the household level and compares migrants and non-migrants. Furthermore, the prevalence of remittances and attitudes towards migration are discussed.

JEL-Classification: C81, F24, R23

Keywords: Kazakhstan, data analysis, regional migration, remittances

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1 Introduction

Since the break-up of the Soviet Union migration has developed dynamically in the region. The newly introduced freedom of movement has allowed people in post-Soviet countries to return to their former homelands or to move because of better economic prospects. Located in the Central Asian part of the former USSR, Kazakhstan is a case in point for high migration rates. Following its independence in 1991, Kazakhstan experienced huge emigration, which accounted for a population loss of 2.04 million people or 13 percent of its population until 2004. Since that year Kazakhstan's external migration balance has been positive. This can be attributed to the almost complete termination of ethnically motivated emigration, the steady inflow of ethnic Kazakhs (*oralmans*) and the growing number of labour immigrants from neighbouring countries (cf. Sadovskaya, 2007; Diener, 2008). Although political and public attention has primarily been devoted to these external movements, internal migration flows in Kazakhstan are of high social and political relevance as well.

Kazakhstan's vast territory covers about 2.7 million sq. km (which makes it the 9th largest country in the world), but it is inhabited by a relatively small population of approximately 16 million people. In administrative terms it is divided into 14 regions (*oblasts*) and two cities (Almaty and Astana).[1] According to official data, interregional migration in Kazakhstan is not particularly intensive although economic and social disparities between regions are very high and do not seem to have decreased over time (cf. Aldashev and Dietz, 2011). Between 2000 and 2010 interregional movements on average involved 138,000 persons per year, i.e. 0.8 percent of the population. In balance, the two big cities Almaty and Astana attracted nearly all internal migrants. The city of Astana received a great number of people from the nearby regions Akmola, Karaganda, Kostanai and East Kazakhstan, while Almaty received most immigrants from the surrounding Almaty *oblast*, Zhambyl, as well as South and East Kazakhstan. According to these data, distance played a role in channelling internal movements.

[1] A description of the economic and social conditions in the different Kazakh *oblasts* can be found in Ursulenko (2010).

Within regions annual migration on average amounted to approximately 166,200 persons (one percent of the population). These movements can predominantly be characterized by population flows from rural to urban areas and by the migration of people from small and medium cities to urban centres. The size of inter- and intraregional migration flows in Kazakhstan is close to that in Russia, but much smaller than that in the USA and Canada (cf. Andrienko and Guriev, 2004).

Although the (internal and international) migration experience of independent Kazakhstan has been unique and highly relevant in economic and social terms, little research has been conducted on this topic yet. Against this backdrop, the cooperative research project "Migration and Remittances in Central Asia: The Case of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan" analyses the determinants and impacts of recent migration movements in Kazakhstan.[2] Because micro level data on migration movements in Kazakhstan are rare or unavailable to researchers, a household survey was conducted with the aim to get first-hand information on migration and remittances in this country and to test standard hypotheses of migration theory. The survey was conducted in four cities in Kazakhstan (Almaty, Astana, Karaganda and Pavlodar) between October and December 2010.

This data report presents the main descriptive results of the household survey. It is structured as follows: In section 2 the project's methodology is summarized, while section 3 gives an overview over the basic characteristics of respondents. Section 4 illustrates migration experiences on the individual and the household level and compares migrants and non-migrants. The prevalence of remittances is discussed in section 5, followed by an analysis of attitudes towards migration in section 6. The final section concludes.

[2] Funded by the Volkswagen Foundation, this project was initiated by the Osteuropa-Institut Regensburg, Germany. It is conducted in cooperation with the Center for Study of Public Opinion (CIOM) Almaty, Kazakhstan and the Research Center (SHARQ) Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

2 Methodology

Because Kazakhstan is a huge country with a low population density and a diverse migration experience, the sampling design and the formulation of the questionnaire were particularly challenging. After collecting relevant statistics, legal documents and descriptive information on migration trends, the household survey was designed to focus on Kazakh households (including *oralmans*, i.e. ethnic Kazakhs who "returned" from Mongolia, China and Uzbekistan) with international or internal migration experience and on households with no migration experience as a control group. To accomplish this goal, the survey faced a number of methodological challenges, first with respect to the sampling approach and the choice of surveyed households and second concerning the design of the questionnaire and the coding of the results.[3]

2.1 Sampling strategy

In designing the household survey it had to be taken into account that migrants are relatively rare elements in the population of Kazakhstan, although the country has been experiencing considerable migration activities since independence. This situation had an impact on the sampling strategy, as a countrywide random sampling could not have guaranteed the inclusion of enough households with migration experience in the survey to allow a meaningful data analysis. Therefore, it was decided to choose regions with a high migration turnover and to define within these regions the ultimate units in which the survey would be conducted. This method is a well-established technique in international migration surveys (cf. Groenewold and Bilsborrow, 2008).

As Kazakh cities – notably Almaty and Astana – attracted by far the highest numbers of internal and international migrants and were likewise the most important sending areas, Almaty and Astana were chosen as sampling regions. The chance to have a reasonably high number of migrants in the survey on the basis of a random procedure was expected to be much higher in these cities than sampling households throughout the country, where a difficult screening procedure would have had to be employed to iden-

[3] For further technical details of the survey see Dietz and Gatskova (2011).

tify a sufficient number of migrant households. The choice of Astana further provided an opportunity to look at migration movements in the context of the relocation of the Kazakh capital city from Almaty to Astana in 1997 (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Regions of Kazkhstan and city locations

However, it could not be ruled out that an exclusive study of migration movements in Almaty and Astana might lead to biased results, as the relocation of the capital city from Almaty to Astana was a unique event (supported by the government) and Almaty has long been the most important urban centre in the country, traditionally attracting high numbers of migrants. Thus two further cities (both *oblast* capitals) were included into the survey, partly to function as a control group. Because of their geographic location, their population size and their ethnic composition, Pavlodar and Karaganda were best qualified for such a comparison (see table 1). Until the relocation of the capital, Karaganda had been Kazakhstan's second city after Almaty in terms of population size, economic weight and human capital endowment, while Pavlodar

had been comparable to Astana.[4] In later years, however, these cities followed different development paths. While in Almaty and even more so in Astana the population size grew steadily between 1989 and 2009, in Karaganda and Pavlodar the number of residents declined between 1989 and 1999, although it moderately increased again until 2009.

Table 1: Population size and ethnic composition in Almaty, Astana, Karaganda and Pavlodar

City	1989	1999	2009
	Population size		
Almaty	1,121,400	1,128,989	1,365,105
Astana	277,365	326,939	639,311
Karaganda	613,800	436,864	465,634
Pavlodar	330,700	300,918	307,880
	Percentage of Kazakh		
Almaty	23.8	38.5	50.1
Astana	17.5	40.9	63.4
Karaganda	12.6	24.2	35.4
Pavlodar	14.4	24.0	37.8

Sources: Brill Olcott (2002); Anacker (2004); Gentile (2004); Statistical Agency of Kazakhstan

Due to their rich and diverse migration experiences, the four cities Astana, Almaty, Karaganda and Pavlodar were defined as sampling regions. In Almaty and Astana we planned to include 550 households in the survey each, while in Karaganda and Pavlodar the number of questioned households was set at 450. Within the four cities random route sampling was applied to select households which were approached for an interview. The routing was based on election lists, which included all streets and micro districts in the respective municipalities. As ten interviews were envisioned on each route, 50 routes were needed in Almaty and Astana, while in Karaganda and Pavlodar 45 routes had to be defined. The routes were chosen by a random number generator from the full list of streets in the respective cities. Within the routes, houses were chosen systematically using a pre-defined interval (i.e. every second single house after the starting house number along the route; in the case

[4] Kazakhstan's new capital city Astana received its current name in 1998. Before that year it had been known as Tselinograd (from 1962 to 1992) and Akmola (after 1992).

of apartment houses, every fifth apartment). Accordingly, the selection of surveyed households within these cities could be accomplished on the base of a random procedure.

The interviews were conducted face to face with either the head of the household or a second influential person in the household, aged 18 years and older. In choosing the respondent, a gender quota was introduced which reflected the male/female ratio in the respective cities. This was implemented to avoid a gender bias as one might expect females to be more often at home or more willing to respond to a survey. Only family members who permanently lived in the household were questioned.

Altogether, 4907 interview attempts were undertaken during the field work leading to a total number of 2012 completed interviews. In those cases where interviews did not work, it was mostly because the addressed respondents refused to take part in the survey (45.4 percent) or did not open their door (40.3 percent). After a strict quality control, 12 interviews had to be rejected. As all interviewers, supervisors and controllers who participated in the project were asked to fill out the questionnaire for training purposes, a total number of 2227 interviews was ultimately realized.

2.2 The questionnaire

The questionnaire was designed to obtain basic information on the determinants, patterns and impacts of migration and on the prevalence and use of remittances. In the interviews the respondents (the head of the household or another influential person in the household) were questioned about basic demographic and social characteristics of all household members. In addition, the survey collected information on household members who had left and were still abroad ("household members currently away"). This information included questions on these members' motivation for moving, their destination and on the living and working conditions abroad.

The core of the questionnaire encompassed questions related to the respondent's current job, migration experience and work history. Respondents with migration experience were also asked about their most recent move, including questions on their motivation for migration and on the impact of the move on their earnings, job advancement and living conditions.

Information about remittances was collected in the household framework, looking at sending and receiving activities alike. Furthermore, a number of questions were posed related to the household's living standard, income and expenditure. As far as appropriate, the structure and the topics of the survey were adapted to established migration questionnaires (cf. Lucas, 2000).

The interviews were conducted either in Russian or Kazakh, depending on the respondent's choice. The interview languages differed widely across cities. While in Almaty 16 percent of respondents opted for the Kazakh language, in Pavlodar only 1.8 percent asked to be interviewed in Kazakh (see table 2). These choices reflect the high relevance of Russian in daily life in Kazakhstan, particularly in Pavlodar and Karaganda, where ethnic Russians make up the majority of the population.

Table 2: Interview language across Kazakh cities

	Almaty	Astana	Karaganda	Pavlodar	All
Kazakh	98	72	10	9	189
in percent	*16.3*	*11.8*	*2.0*	*1.8*	*8.5*
Russian	505	539	501	493	2038
in percent	*83.7*	*88.2*	*98.0*	*98.2*	*91.5*
All	603	611	511	502	2227

Source: migration database

The length of the interviews depended on the respondents' migration experiences and on the size of their families. While the shortest interview took 30 minutes, the longest lasted for 168 minutes. On average, the interview time was 47 minutes.

3 Basic characteristics of households and respondents

2227 respondents participated in our survey on migration and remittances in Kazakhstan. They provided information about their demographic background, their work and migration patterns and the characteristics and living conditions of their households. Furthermore, the survey collected basic information on all household members (survey population), i.e. 6752 persons. The distribution of respondents and household members

among the four cities covered by our survey is reported in table 3. On average, the family size amounted to three persons, ranging from single households to families with 14 members. The average household size did not differ much across cities: it ranged from 2.9 family members in Karaganda to 3.2 in Almaty.

Table 3: Respondents, survey population and household size

	Almaty	Astana	Karaganda	Pavlodar	All
Respondents	603	611	511	502	2227
Survey population	1927	1836	1486	1504	6753
Household size	3.2	3.0	2.9	3.0	3.0

Source: migration database

Altogether, 53.8 percent of respondents were females and 46.2 percent were males, approximately mirroring the female/male relation in urban Kazakhstan in 2010.[5] Because a gender quota had been pre-defined, the gender ratio of respondents was close to that of the respective cities (cf. table 4).

Table 4: Respondents and city population in Kazakhstan (2010) by gender

	Females (in percent)		Males (in percent)	
	Survey	Population	Survey	Population
Almaty	56.6	54.6	43.4	45.4
Astana	52.0	50.8	48.0	49.2
Karaganda	56.8	54.7	43.2	45.3
Pavlodar	58.6	54.4	41.4	45.6

Sources: migration database, Statistical Agency of Kazakhstan

[5] According to the Statistical Agency of Kazakhstan, the male/female relation is 46.6 to 53.4 percent.

A comparison of the age structure of the survey population with the urban population in Kazakhstan shows pretty consistent figures. The same can also be said for the cities Almaty and Astana, for which information on the age structure of the population is available on city level. The average inhabitant of the city of Astana is younger than the average person living in Almaty, Karaganda or Pavlodar. This may reflect Astana's status as Kazakhstan's new capital that attracts young professionals and public sector workers (cf. table 5).

Table 5: Age structure of the survey and city population in Kazakhstan (2010)

	Age groups					
	0–14 (in percent)		15–64 (in percent)		65+ (in percent)	
	Survey	Population	Survey	Population	Survey	Population
Almaty	18.0	19.3	75.0	71.9	7.1	8.8
Astana	20.0	18.2	77.1	75.9	2.9	5.9
Karaganda	16.7	n.a.	76.0	n.a.	7.3	n.a.
Pavlodar	17.3	n.a.	76.6	n.a.	6.1	n.a.
All	18.1	22.7*	76.1	69.8*	5.8	7.5*

*Urban population in Kazakhstan

Sources: migration database, Statistical Agency of Kazakhstan

Among all respondents, 60 percent were married, 22 percent had no spouse or partner and eleven percent were widowed. Children and youths under the age of 16 were living in 18 percent of the households.

With the exception of a very small group of Russian citizens, nearly all respondents held the Kazakh citizenship (98.3 percent). However, this did not necessarily coincide with their ethnic belonging: only 38.8 percent of the interviewees were ethnic Kazakhs, 45.5 percent had Russian roots, 4.5 percent were Ukrainians, 2.6 percent Tatars and 2.3 percent Germans. Others affiliated with some of the wide range of ethnicities living in Kazakhstan because of forced resettlement or voluntary migration, such as Koreans, Byelorussians, Uigurs or Uzbeks. Among ethnic Kazakhs, 2.4 percent of respondents were *oralmans*, i.e. Kazakh "returnees" from neighbouring countries, especially from China, Mongolia and Uzbekistan.

The relatively high percentage of ethnic Russians in the survey reflects the ethnic composition of Kazakhstan's bigger cities (see table 6) and is not representative for the country as a whole.[6] According to the 2009 census, 61 percent of the Kazakh population were ethnic Kazakhs, 23.7 percent were Russians and the rest belonged to a wide range of other ethnic groups. Twenty years earlier, in 1989, the ethnic composition of the Kazakh Soviet Republic had been dramatically different: 39.7 percent of the population had been Kazakh and 37.8 percent Russian.

Table 6: Ethnic composition of respondents and city population in Kazakhstan (2010)

	Kazakh (in percent)		Russian (in percent)		Other (in percent)	
	Survey	Population	Survey	Population	Survey	Population
Almaty	47.3	51.7	38.6	33.5	14.1	14.8
Astana	51.7	65.2	35.2	23.8	13.1	11.0
Karaganda	21.7	35.4	60.1	46.2	18.2	18.4
Pavlodar	30.7	37.4	51.4	46.4	17.9	15.9
All	38.9	61.1	45.5	23.7	15.2	14.9

Sources: migration database, Statistical Agency of Kazakhstan

Both our survey and official data show that the ethnic composition of respondents differs widely between cities. While in Astana and Almaty a plurality of residents are Kazakhs, in Karaganda and Pavlodar Russians rank first.

Until independence, Russian had been the official language of the Kazakh Soviet Republic while Kazakh only played a minor role, used for communication either within the family or in smaller villages with a high share of ethnic Kazakhs. In 1995, the constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the first time defined the legal status of languages in independent Kazakhstan. It made Kazakh the state language and Russian the "language of interethnic communication". At the same time, it was decided that in no less than 15 years all public employees should know Kazakh.

[6] The share of Russians is typically higher in Kazakhstan's urban areas as Russians have traditionally settled in cities.

In 2001 a government program on "the functioning and development of languages for 2001–2010" was enacted. Its official goals were to expand and strengthen the communicative function of the state language, to preserve the cultural function of the Russian language and to develop the languages of ethnic minorities. A 2006 amendment to this program contained concrete measures to establish the state language as mandatory in the fields of public administration, legislation and legal proceedings until 2010 (cf. Vdovina, 2008). Nevertheless, the Russian language continues to play a dominant role in communication and the media. This is reflected in our survey's results with respect to language competence: table 7 shows that when asked what language they spoke best, 63 percent of respondents named Russian, 36 percent Kazakh and one percent other languages.

Table 7: Respondents' language competence (in percent)

	Almaty	Astana	Karaganda	Pavlodar	All
Russian	53.9	49.2	82.6	71.3	63.1
Kazakh	44.9	50.2	16.6	27.4	35.9
Other	1.2	0.6	0.8	1.3	1.0

Source: migration database

In a city-by-city comparison, the difference in language competence is considerable. Astana is the only city where a majority of people report to speak Kazakh best, while in all other cities it is Russian. This might be linked to the status of Astana as the capital city because the Kazakh language is envisaged to become the first language in administration and politics. In contrast, in Pavlodar and Karaganda the Russian language competence is particularly distinct, most likely reflecting the strong Russian influence over long periods.

The average educational attainment of respondents is rather high. Approximately 80 percent have completed either vocational or higher education (cf. table 8). In terms of education, Astana stands out: more than half of respondents from this city graduated from an institute of tertiary education or a university.

Table 8: Respondents' educational attainment (in percent)

	Almaty	Astana	Karaganda	Pavlodar	All
Compulsory	24.0	11.8	25.8	18.1	19.8
Vocational	33.2	37.1	40.3	54.8	40.8
Higher	42.8	51.1	33.9	27.1	39.4

Source: migration database

When asked what they were doing at the time of the survey, 68.3 percent of respondents reported to work, 3.3 percent were unemployed or looking for a job and 2.9 percent were students. A further 14.7 percent were retired and eight percent were housewives. Among all surveyed cities, Astana stands out with respect to an above average share of jobholders and a low fraction of pensioners. This emphasizes the boom-town character of Kazakhstan's new capital (cf. table 9).

Table 9: Respondents' activity (in percent)

	Almaty	Astana	Karaganda	Pavlodar	All
Work	63.7	77.5	64.3	66.7	68.3
Unemployed	4.9	2.6	2.8	2.9	3.3
Study	3.9	1.5	5.2	1.0	2.9
Pensioner	16.9	7.0	19.0	17.1	14.7
Housewife	9.6	7.2	6.9	8.1	8.0
Other	1.0	4.2	1.8	4.2	2.8

Source: migration database

Together with individual socio-demographic characteristics our survey asked how respondents evaluated the welfare situation of their household. In that context they were asked to indicate where their household would be located on a social ladder between 1 (poorest) and 10 (richest).

Table 10: Welfare of respondents' household (in percent)

	Almaty	Astana	Karaganda	Pavlodar	All
Poor	27.0	13.7	29.5	29.1	24.4
Middle	50.7	48.4	52.4	48.2	49.9
Rich	22.2	37.8	18.0	22.7	25.6

Notes: Poor: 1–4, middle: 5–6 and rich: 7–10 on a ladder between 1 and 10.
Source: migration database

Table 10 reveals that approximately one half of respondents classified their household's welfare in the middle, while one quarter reported to live in a poor household and another quarter in a rich one. If one compares the answers across cities, it is striking that more than one third of the respondents in Astana reported to reside in a rich household. This might partly reflect the capital city's booming economy as people were asked to evaluate their welfare in the local context.

4 Migration experiences

4.1 General overview

A general overview of our database with respect to migration experiences is presented in table 11. Here, we do not distinguish between internal and international migrants (this information is provided below in section 4.2.2.) and the focus is on rather general sample characteristics. Out of 2227 households (including 6753 household members) that participated in the study, over 63 percent include at least one person with some kind of migration experience. This provides a favourable background for research on migration-related issues.

The sample also includes information on groups that tend to be hard to access, such as *oralmans* (ethnic Kazakhs, who "returned" to newly independent Kazakhstan from abroad) and family members that are currently not living within their households. Although the number of such units is not very large (61 and 71 persons, respectively), appropriate analyses can give some general insights on typical characteristics and tendencies associated with these households.

Table 11: Migration experience across Kazakh cities

	Almaty	Astana	Karaganda	Pavlodar	All
Household level					
Households with a migrant	389	336	309	386	1420
Households without migrants	214	275	202	116	807
Individual level					
Household members living in the family	1904	1826	1476	1476	6682
Household members currently away	23	10	10	28	71
Recent migrants	114	142	72	62	390
Earlier migrants	236	149	163	268	816
Non-migrants	253	320	276	172	1021
Oralmans	10	32	5	14	61

Source: migration database

We define the group of recent migrants as persons who changed their place of residence in the nine years prior to the survey, that is, those who migrated after January 1, 2002. Correspondingly, the group of earlier migrants includes those persons who moved before December 31, 2001. These definitions help to differentiate between two types of migration flows and to capture the most important differences between life conditions, work careers, and socio-economic positions of earlier and recent migrants.[7]

4.2 Migrants' characteristics

4.2.1 Incidence of migration

Here, we distinguish two groups of adult participants of the survey (16 years old and older, N = 5392) that are differentiated on the basis of the question: "*Have you ever lived in another place in Kazakhstan or a different country for more than six months (excluding long lasting business/tourist trips)?"* Empirical data from our survey show that practically half (49 percent) of the respondents indicated that they had migrated at

[7] We have chosen the cut-off year 2001, because by this year the ethnically motive emigration of Russians and Germans had mostly been terminated, the economic situation had been stabilized and the capital had been relocated to Astana.

least once in their life. Another half of the respondents (51 percent) stated that they had always lived in the same place in Kazakhstan.

A very similar pattern of answers is observed for Almaty and more or less also for Astana (cf. figure 2). The distribution of answers in Karaganda and Pavlodar deviates from the overall picture: Karaganda's sample includes a considerably higher proportion of respondents without migration experience (57.9 percent). By contrast, Pavlodar's population is characterized by the highest percentage of migrants across the four cities covered in our survey (57.2 percent).

Figure 2: Migration experience of respondents by current place of residence (in percent)



Source: migration database

4.2.2 Pre-migration situation[8]

Figure 3 shows that most of the migrants in our sample are internal migrants. About 90 percent of those that moved after 2002 came from inside Kazakhstan while about five percent originated in Russia. The remainder of the sample had lived in a third country before migrating (in particular Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan). If one includes migrants who moved before or during 2001, one finds a far higher proportion of international migrants. In the whole sample only 70 percent of migrants are internal migrants. 20 percent moved from Russia and ten percent from a third country (mostly from other CIS member countries). It can be shown that the different patterns between recent and all migrants are mainly driven by the large number of people who migrated from Russia to Kazakhstan before the break-up of the Soviet Union.

Figure 3: Migration experience and pre-migration country



Source: migration database

A closer look at the destination city of internal and international migrants is provided by figure 4. The figure reveals that more than 95 percent of recent migrants whose destination was Karaganda had already lived in Kazakhstan before moving. This is the case for only about 90 percent of individuals who migrated to Almaty and Astana and for less than 80 percent of those that came to Pavlodar. The relatively high rate of interna-

[8] Unless otherwise noted, the focus of this and the following sections will be on recent migrants, that is those individuals who moved after 2001.

tional immigration to Pavlodar can probably be explained by its location in Northern Kazakhstan and by its high proportion of Russian inhabitants.

Figure 4: Internal and international migration and city of destination



Source: migration database

A more detailed breakdown of the pre-migration location of internal migrants (not presented here for the sake of conciseness) reveals a very strong gravity effect. More specifically, about 30 percent of internal immigrants to Almaty and Astana came from the regions (*oblasts*) surrounding these cities. Corresponding figures are even higher for Karaganda and Pavlodar: more than half (52.3 percent) of those individuals that internally moved to Karaganda came from the surrounding Karagandinskaya *oblast* and almost two thirds (66 percent) of immigrants to Pavlodar migrated from the Pavlodarskaya *oblast* (cf. section 1).

The evidence presented in table 12 is again related to the origin of recent immigrants to Almaty, Astana, Karaganda and Pavlodar, but shifts the focus to the size of their pre-migration location. The table shows that about 45 percent of migrants in our sample came from cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, about 15 percent moved from cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants and the rest had lived in a village or *aul* before moving.

Table 12: Migration, pre-migration location and city of destination

In which place in Kazakhstan or different country did you live before moving?					
	Almaty	Astana	Karaganda	Pavlodar	Total
City >100000	56	78	20	19	173
	49.12 %	*54.93 %*	*27.78 %*	*30.65 %*	*44.36 %*
City <100000	16	18	11	9	54
	14.04 %	*12.68 %*	*15.28 %*	*14.52 %*	*13.85 %*
Village/*aul*	42	46	41	34	163
	36.84 %	*32.39 %*	*56.94 %*	*54.84 %*	*41.79 %*
Total	114	142	72	62	390
	100 %	*100 %*	*100 %*	*100 %*	*100 %*

Source: migration database

The table also reveals striking differences between the four destination cities in the focus of this report: while 55 percent of immigrants to Astana had been living in a city with more than 100,000 inhabitants before they moved to Kazakhstan's new capital, this had been the case for only about half (49.1 percent) of those who moved to Almaty and for about 30 percent of those that migrated to Karaganda or Pavlodar. Conversely, approximately 55 percent of immigrants to Karaganda and Pavlodar originated in a village or *aul* in contrast to only 35 percent of those who moved to Almaty or Astana. All in all, our data confirm the well-known pattern of migration happening in steps: in general, people tend to move from villages or small towns to medium-sized cities (often close-by) and from medium-sized cities to large cities. Migration flows from villages directly to large cities are generally much smaller.

Figure 5: Migration, ethnicity and city of destination



Source: migration database

Figure 6: Migration, language and city of destination



Source: migration database

4.2.3 Demographic characteristics

A closer description of selected demographic characteristics of migrants is provided by figures 5 and 6. The former contains data on migrants' ethnicity, the latter on their language proficiency. Figure 5 shows that about 70 percent of recent migrants in our sample identified themselves as ethnic Kazakhs, 20 percent as Russians and ten percent as members of another ethnicity. If one differentiates by city of destination, one finds that

about 80 percent of immigrants to Almaty were ethnic Kazakhs. At the same time, this is the case for only 70 percent of individuals who moved to Astana and for less than 60 percent of those who immigrated to Karaganda or Pavlodar. This pattern can probably be explained by the fact that Astana and especially Almaty have a higher proportion of Kazakh inhabitants than Karaganda and Pavlodar.

When it comes to language proficiency, figure 6 reports answers to the question *"What language do you speak best?"* It shows that almost two thirds of respondents (65.9 percent) answered "Kazakh" to this question while roughly one third (33.1 percent) said "Russian". Very few reported that they spoke any other language best. Again, the figure also provides a breakdown of answers by city of destination. This breakdown results in a pattern qualitatively comparable to the one found for ethnicity: while almost 80 percent of migrants to Almaty reported that Kazakh was the language they spoke best, the corresponding figure for Astana was only about 65 percent. For Karaganda and Pavlodar it was even lower with slightly over half (55.6 and 54.8 percent, respectively) of the migrants reporting that Kazakh was the language they spoke best.

Table 13: Reasons for moving

Why did you move to the current residence?			
	Male	Female	Total
Because family moved / to join family	31	44	75
	16.76 %	*21.46 %*	*19.23 %*
To work	76	59	135
	41.08 %	*28.78 %*	*34.62 %*
To marry	12	20	32
	6.49 %	*9.76 %*	*8.21 %*
To return to "ethnic homeland"	9	10	19
	4.86 %	*4.88 %*	*4.87 %*
To study	38	54	92
	20.54 %	*26.34 %*	*23.59 %*
Other reasons	19	18	37
	10.27 %	8.78 %	9.49 %
Total	185	205	390
	100 %	100 %	100 %

Source: migration database

Our questionnaire also contains the question *"By which means did you finance the move and initial living costs?"* It turns out that about 40 percent of migrants primarily financed their move through assistance from family members. This result shows that in Kazakhstan family ties are extremely important. Another 30 percent of migrants stated that they had primarily relied on their own savings to fund their move and around 15 percent financed it by selling their home or land. Interestingly, almost no migrants – and not even those that had moved to Astana – answered "yes" to a related question that asked respondents about whether their move had been supported by a governmental program.[9]

4.2.4 Reasons for moving

We now turn to migrants' motivation for moving.[10] Table 13 distinguishes family-, education- and work-related motives, marriage and the wish to "return to the ethnic homeland". The table shows that a plurality of sampled individuals – about 35 percent – moved for work-related reasons. Another quarter (23.6 percent) of respondents migrated in order to study whereas 20 percent of individuals migrated because their family moved or because they wanted to join their family. In addition to that, almost ten percent of migrants named getting married as their main reason for moving and about ten percent gave one of various other reasons.

Table 13 also compares the motives of male and female migrants. This comparison reveals some striking differences between genders: While more than 40 percent of males moved because of their work, less than 30 percent of females reported that work-related motives had been their main reason for moving. At the same time, more than 20 percent of females migrated because their family moved or because they wanted to join their family. The corresponding figure for males is about five percentage points smaller. Interestingly, females were also more likely to migrate than males because of reasons related to their education (26.3 percent of females stated this motive compared to 20.5 percent of males).

[9] See Anacker (2004) for a detailed examination of the relocation of Kazakhstan's capital from Almaty to Astana.

[10] Respondents were allowed to give multiple answers to the question *"Why did you move to the current residence?"*, but we will focus solely on what they said was their most important reason. Taking their other answers into account would not qualitatively alter the resulting picture.

Figure 7: Migration and social status



Source: migration database

4.2.5 Consequences of migration

After describing migrants' characteristics and their reasons for moving we now turn to what they reported about the consequences of migration. In this context, our survey asked migrants *"Where on a ladder between 1 (poorest) and 10 (richest) would the household in which you lived in the last place before moving be located?"* Respondents were also asked where on such a social ladder they would place their current household and the answers to both questions are summarized in figure 7. As already described in section 3, we aggregated the ten-step ladder into three categories (poor: 1–4, middle: 5–6 and rich: 7–10).

Figure 7 shows that before they moved, more than 20 percent of individuals had seen themselves in the lowest of the three categories (poor), while about 25 percent had put themselves in the highest category (rich). After migration, less than 15 percent reported being in the lowest category and more than 35 percent placed themselves in the highest category. Thus, on average migrating seems to have been associated with a gain in social status. A closer look at answers given before and after migration (not reported here) shows that very few migrants "jumped" from the lowest to the highest category by moving. Rather, most either stayed in the same group or reported moving up (or sometimes down) one category.

Table 14: Migration and earnings

Did you earn more, about the same or less than in your job before the move?					
	Almaty	Astana	Karaganda	Pavlodar	Total
More	21	53	15	15	104
	52.5 %	63.1 %	42.86 %	48.39 %	54.74 %
Same	11	15	10	6	42
	27.5 %	17.86 %	28.57 %	19.35 %	22.11 %
Less	8	16	10	10	44
	20 %	19.05 %	28.57 %	32.26 %	23.16 %
Total	40	84	35	31	190
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

Source: migration database

A closely related issue is shown in table 14. The table reports answers to the question "When you started your first work after moving to your current place, did you earn more, about the same or less than in your job before the move?" Again, we find that on average migration had a positive effect: almost 55 percent of migrants earned more after migrating than they had done before. But while the earnings of more than 20 percent of movers stayed about the same, there is also a sizeable group of migrants (also over 20 percent of respondents) who report that their earnings dropped right after migration. At first glance, one might find this result surprising, because one might expect that someone only migrates to another place if this leads to an improvement in earnings. However, migration decisions might be influenced by a great number of factors other than earnings; Lall et al. (2009), for instance, document that internal migrants in Brazil often move in order to gain access to basic public services such as clean water and sanitation.

Once again, it is illuminating to look at differences between destination cities. Perhaps not surprisingly, the share of migrants who earned more after migration was highest for those who moved to Astana; almost 65 percent of individuals who immigrated to Kazakhstan's new capital reported that they had earned more after migration than they had done before. For Almaty and Pavlodar, about 50 percent of immigrants said that they had earned more after their move than before, while only 40 percent of immigrants that moved to Karaganda had higher earnings after moving than before. Inversely, about 20 percent of

immigrants to Almaty or Astana earned less after moving than they had done before, while this was the case for 30 percent of individuals who migrated to Karaganda or Pavlodar.

4.3 A comparison of migrants and non-migrants

4.3.1 Demographic characteristics

The results reported in this section refer to differences in demographic characteristics between groups that can be distinguished on the basis of their migration experience. The comparison is realized in two different dimensions: First, respondents with some migration experience during the course of their lives ("migrants") are compared to those who always lived in the same place in Kazakhstan ("non-migrants"). Second, the focus is on a comparison of respondents who migrated recently (after 2002) versus those who migrated further in the past (before or during 2001). These two dimensions will allow us to describe the phenomenon of migration in Kazakhstan in detail.

Figure 8: Recent (after 2002) and earlier (before or during 2001) migrants in the cities (in percent)



Source: migration database

Across cities, Astana has the highest percentage of recent migrants (48.8 percent of all migrants) and Pavlodar the lowest (18.8 percent). In Almaty and Karaganda the share of recent migrants among all respondents who have at least once changed their place of residence in the course of their lives is slightly above 30 percent (cf. figure 8).

With respect to the gender of respondents, the shares of males and females among migrants and non-migrants are virtually identical (cf. figure 9). 54.4 percent of all respondents in our survey are female, 45.6 percent are male. This proportion is roughly the same for all groups considered here. However, there is a slightly higher percentage of women in the group of respondents with migration experience and especially in the group of earlier migrants (i.e. the group of those who changed their place of residence before 2002).[11] As will be shown below, this is likely to result from the fact that there are more women than men among older respondents, and older people are of course more likely to have changed their place of residence during their lives.

Figure 9: Gender and migration experience (in percent)



Source: migration database

[11] Conversely, 50.6 percent of women and 47 percent of men have changed their place of residence at least once.

In fact, figure 10 shows that 69.1 percent of people aged 60 years and older have had a migration experience during their life. Among the youngest respondents, 40.8 percent have at least once changed their place of residence. This is the smallest percentage among all age groups.

Figure 10: Age groups and migration experience (in percent)



Source: migration database

However, figure 11 makes it clear that the youngest group of the surveyed population constitutes the biggest part of the group of recent migrants. This means that younger individuals are more likely to move from one place to another than older people. Put another way, the majority of those who migrated (48.5 percent) from 2002 to 2010 were people under 30.

Figure 11: Age structure of recent and earlier migrants (in percent)



Source: migration database

When turning to the ethnical composition of the population with migration experience, an interesting picture can be observed. 62.7 percent of ethnic Russians who live in Astana, Almaty, Karaganda or Pavlodar have never changed their place of residence, whereas only 38.3 percent of ethnic Kazakhs have no migration experience at all (cf. figure 12). This finding points at differences in the migration patterns of the two biggest ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, Kazakhs and Russians. The latter are less likely to move within the country, and, according to statistical data and recent publications on migration in Kazakhstan, the migration flows of this group were mostly directed out of Kazakhstan during the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union (cf. Ziegler, 2006). According to Peyrouse (2007, p. 493) the percentage of Russians living in Kazakhstan dropped dramatically during the 1990s and the emigration of Russians continues even today, although the majority of those wanting to migrate have already left the country.

Going into even more detail, our results suggest that only 3.4 percent of ethnic Russians covered by our survey changed their place of residence within Kazakhstan from 2002 to 2010 (in general, 37.3 of ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan have some migration experience). At the same time, 61.7 percent of ethnic Kazakhs have at least once changed their place of residence and 46.4 percent of them have done so in the nine years preceding our survey.

Figure 12: Migration experience of the largest ethnic groups (in percent)



Source: migration database

4.3.2 Social position

There are several characteristics that may describe the social status of a respondent; the most important of them are his or her education, occupation, level of income and housing conditions. In the following, we will examine differences between migrants and non-migrants in Kazakhstan with respect to these characteristics.

As a first step, the sample of respondents was divided into three educational groups according to the highest degree of education a person had attained: compulsory education, vocational education or higher education. The data show that all educational groups have roughly the same rates of migration experience (48.2, 48.9 and 49.7 percent, respectively). The fact that the educational structure of earlier migrants (i.e. those who moved before or during 2001) corresponds to the overall educational structure of respondents (cf. table 15) strongly suggests that in the past migration practices did not depend on respondents' educational attainments. However, an analysis of the educational structure of recent migrants reveals that the share of respondents with higher education has recently been much larger (44.4 percent) than it was in the years before 2002.

Table 15: Educational attainment of migrants (in percent)

	All respondents	Earlier migrants	Recent migrants
Compulsory education	24,9	21,9	19,0
Vocational education	40,2	42,2	36,7
Higher education	35,0	35,9	44,4

Source: migration database

Our data show that the share of better-educated people among older generations is smaller than among younger ones (24 percent of respondents aged over 60 years have attained higher education compared to 34 percent of those aged between 16 and 29). These changes in educational structure are reflected in the large percentages of highly educated recent migrants. One should, however, not forget that the survey was conducted only in the big cities of Kazakhstan; therefore, no conclusion about the relationship between educational attainment and the level of migration to/between villages could be derived from our data.

Figure 13 provides a general overview over the migration experience by employment status. Within the group of respondents who were employed at the time of the survey, individuals with no migration experience make up 48.7 percent. Out of the other 51.3 percent with some kind of migration experience, more than a half (65.3 percent) moved before 2002. The group of current students and trainees in Kazakhstan contains many persons who moved at least once between 2002 and 2010 (55.6 percent of them did). Apparently, students residing in the big cities make up a considerable part of recent migrants in Kazakhstan. The share of people not employed at the time they answered the questionnaire (including housewives and those who are not registered as unemployed in official agencies but looking for a job) is the same among recent migrants and non-migrants (11.5 and 11.8 percent, respectively). This means that recent migrants in Kazakhstan seem to have the same likelihood of being unemployed or out of the labour force as the rest of the population. In accordance with results presented above, there is a large share of earlier migrants among the older population group represented by pensioners (including disabled persons): 62 percent of them have at least once changed their place of residence during their lives.

Figure 13: Employment and migration experience (in percent)



Source: migration database

There is one more status-related issue that is worth considering while examining social positions of migrants in Kazakhstan. This is the self-estimation of one's social position with the help of the social ladder introduced in section 3 which is based on the question: *"Where on a ladder between 1 (poorest) and 10 (richest) would your household be located in the place of residence, where you are living now?"* Based on the percentages of answers within each of the three groups distinguished here (recent migrants, earlier migrants and non-migrants) figure 14 summarizes respondents' self-evaluations.

Figure 14 shows that recent migrants are more likely to see their household as relatively rich as compared to respondents from other groups, especially compared to those from non-migrants. The latter would place their household mostly between the 4th and 6th score (which represent the 25th and the 75th percentiles, respectively; for recent migrants these values are 5 and 7).

Figure 14: Social status (in percent)

(Where on a ladder between 1 (poorest) and 10 (richest) would your household be located in the place of residence, where you are living now (in percent)?



Source: migration database

Figure 15: Place of residence and migration experience (in percent)



Source: migration database

Concerning housing conditions, figure 15 shows that they differ considerably between the three groups distinguished here. It is evident from the data that recent migrants are far more likely to live in rented apartments (32.8 percent) and rented houses (7.2 percent) than persons without migration experience or earlier migrants. At the same time, respondents who moved to their current residence before 2002 do not differ from

the people without migration experience in respect to their housing conditions. Both groups for the most part live in their privately owned flats (66–67 percent) and houses (26–27 percent).

5 Remittances

5.1 Incidence

This section will give a brief overview over the importance and structure of remittances in our sample as well as the relationship between remittances and migration. We identify whether people received remittances with the help of the question *"During the past 12 months, have you or your family received financial support from people who are not living with you?"* Figure 16 summarizes how the 2227 individuals in our sample answered this question and also whether respondents themselves provided such support during the 12 months preceding the interview.

Figure 16: Incidence of remittances



Source: migration database

The figure shows that around 16.4 percent of sampled individuals received some kind of financial support. A slightly higher proportion of respondents – almost one out of five – reported that they had provided help.

Table 16: Remittances and sources of support

Who has supported you financially during the last 12 months?		
	Frequency	Percentage
Household members currently away	8	2.19 %
Relatives	334	91.51 %
Others	23	6.30 %
Total	365	100 %

Source: migration database

More information on remittances is given in table 16, which distinguishes three sources of financial support: household members currently away, relatives and others (mostly friends).[12] It turns out that household members currently away provided only a small proportion of remittances. This can probably be explained at least partly by the small size of this group (see section 4.1). Friends are not an important source of remittances either. Taken together, less than ten percent of respondents named household members currently away or friends as their principal source of support. Instead, 91.51 percent of the 365 individuals who reported that they had received financial support in the twelve months before being interviewed said that it had primarily come from relatives. This picture once again stresses the important role of family ties in Kazakhstan.

A related question in the survey asked respondents *"What was the main reason why the donor provided this help/support?"* The most common answers to this question included child support, educational and medical expenses as well as the purchase of durable goods. At the same time, however, more than a quarter of those who had received financial support during the twelve months preceding the interview reported that this support had been provided for the purchase of food or other basic needs.[13]

[12] A very similar pattern would emerge if one looked at support provided by respondents instead.

[13] Again, a very similar picture emerges if the focus is not on the financial support respondents received but about the help they provided.

5.2 Remittances and migration

Next, we will investigate the incidence of remittances for two types of families: first, households that include members with some migration experience, and second, households that consist exclusively of persons who have never changed their place of residence.

Figure 17: Donors and recipients in families with and without migration experience (in percent)



Source: migration database

Our data suggest that families without migration experience receive and provide financial support to the same (relatively small) extent as in the sample as a whole (cf. figure 17). During the twelve months preceding the interview 84.6 percent of such families did not receive remittances and 88.5 did not provide them. Households that include at least one member with some migration experience report practically the same degree of not receiving support by donors (83 percent). At the same time, they appear a bit more likely to provide financial support themselves. 23 percent of the households with migration experience indicate that they provided financial support to persons not living with them during the twelve months before the survey.

6 Attitudes towards immigration and immigrants

In recent years immigration to Kazakhstan has increased considerably, particularly in the context of short-term and often irregular labour immigration. Against this background, it is of interest to study the attitudes of the population in Kazakhstan towards immigration and immigrants. For comparative purposes, the questions posed in this part

of the survey were closely related to the Eurobarometer survey and the immigration module of the European Social Survey, which were developed to study the public opinion about immigration in European societies.[14] This approach provides an opportunity to investigate how attitudes towards migration in the new immigration destination Kazakhstan compare to those in other countries and if attitudes vary with the demographic, social and ethnic characteristics of respondents.[15]

Figure 18: Perception of immigration

(Percentage of respondents who think that the number of immigrants in Kazakhstan should be reduced, increased or remain unchanged)



Source: migration database

To arrive at a general assessment of attitudes towards immigration in Kazakhstan, respondents were asked to indicate whether the number of immigrants living in Kazakhstan should be reduced a lot/a little, remain unchanged or should be increased a little/a lot. Figure 18 shows that close to 40 percent of respondents wish the current number of

[14] For an introduction to the migration module of the first European Social Survey see Card et al. (2005).

[15] Based on Eurobarometer data, Gang et al. (2011) studied the changes in attitudes towards immigrants in Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

immigrants to be reduced and a nearly similar proportion prefers their number to remain unchanged. In contrast, an increase in the number of immigrants has only very little support. A look at ethnic and social groupings reveals that an above-average proportion of lower educated persons, non-migrants, and ethnic Kazakhs support a reduction of the number of immigrants. Approximately every eighth respondent does not know what to answer to this question. This might reflect a comparatively high degree of insecurity with respect to immigration issues in Kazakhstan.

Potentially, there are many channels through which immigration might have an impact on a country's society. While some might argue that it contributes to an increase in the labour supply and might therefore depress wages or raise unemployment, it could also reduce workforce bottlenecks in services and production and help to stimulate the economy. Employers and high-skilled workers can in many cases be expected to gain from immigration – particularly if low-skilled persons enter the country – while lower skilled individuals are more likely to lose.

Although many population groups associate immigration with a higher incidence of unemployment and decreasing wages, it is a widespread phenomenon that lower educated persons are particularly afraid of immigrants taking away their jobs. This well-known pattern is also confirmed by our survey: when confronted with the statement *"immigrants take jobs away from citizens in Kazakhstan"* more than half of the respondents in our survey agreed or agreed strongly (cf. figure 19). However, when one differentiates by educational attainment, 61 percent of those with a lower education were afraid of losing their jobs to immigrants in contrast to 45 percent of those with a higher education. Furthermore, persons who had migrated themselves recently (i.e. after 2002) were less concerned about job losses related to immigrants than other respondents.

Figure 19: Perception of immigrants' employment effects

(Percentage of respondents who agree or disagree with the statement *"immigrants take jobs away from citizens in Kazakhstan*")



Source: migration database

A glance at Eurobarometer 2009, which reflects the attitudes of the population in EU countries, shows similar results: nearly half of the Eurobarometer respondents supported the statement *"immigrants increase unemployment"* (cf. European Commission, 2010). Again, there are noticeable differences with respect to the educational profile of respondents: only 38 percent of the better educated think that immigrants increase unemployment compared with 61 percent of those with little schooling.

In many countries opposition against immigration is articulated in connection with the argument that the inflow of foreigners would increase crime rates. Nearly half of the respondents in our survey of four Kazakh cities supported this view (cf. figure 20). Although differences between ethnic and social groups were not very pronounced, recent migrants and individuals of Kazakh origin tended to disagree with this statement more often than the rest of our sample.

Figure 20: Perception of immigrants' effects on crime rates

(Percentage of respondents who agree or disagree with the statement *"immigrants increase crime rates"*)



Source: migration database

In recent years there has been a debate about whether immigration not only has an impact on the receiving country's economy but also on its society and culture. As immigrants bring along various cultural skills and values this might broaden and enrich the cultural life of countries with a large inflow of immigrants. On the other hand, it might also be a source of intercultural or interethnic conflicts. When confronted with the statement "immigrants improve Kazakhstan's society by bringing new ideas and cultures", approximately one quarter of the respondents agreed, while 46 percent disagreed and 9 percent did not know what to answer (figure 21). An above-average number of recent migrants and ethnic Kazakhs supported the opinion that immigrants might have a positive impact on cultural life in Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, the general picture reveals a comparatively strong opposition against the view that immigrants enrich a society by bringing new ideas and cultures.

Figure 21: Perception of immigrants' cultural contribution

(Percentage of respondents who agree or disagree with the statement *"immigrants improve Kazakhstan's society by bringing new ideas and cultures"*)



Source: migration database

A comparison with people's attitudes in EU countries reveals strikingly different results. More than half (54 percent) of the respondents in the 2009 Eurobarometer survey tended to agree with the statement "people from other ethnic groups enrich the culture of our country", while 30 percent tended to disagree and twelve percent said it depends. Only four percent did not know what to answer. This indicates that individuals in European societies have a more positive and explicit opinion about the role of foreigners in shaping the cultural life of their societies.

7 Summary and conclusions

This report presents the first results of a household survey on migration and remittances in Kazakhstan which was conducted in four cities – Almaty, Astana, Karaganda and Pavlodar – between October and December 2010. As described above, the selection of surveyed households within these cities was accomplished by a random route procedure. Altogether 2227 households were questioned including 6753 family members. A

comparison of basic demographic and social characteristics of the survey population and the respective city inhabitants reveals a high correspondence with respect to gender, age structure and ethnic composition.

A detailed description of migrants' characteristics shows – among many other things – that 90 percent of recent migrants in our sample were internal migrants, that 70 percent identified themselves as ethnic Kazakhs, 20 percent as Russians and ten percent as members of another ethnicity. Almost two thirds answered "Kazakh" when questioned about which language they spoke best while roughly one third said "Russian". Concerning the reasons for moving, a plurality of migrants in the sample – about 35 percent – moved for work-related reasons. Another quarter of respondents migrated in order to study, whereas 20 percent of individuals migrated because their family moved or because they wanted to join their family. In addition to that, almost ten percent of migrants name getting married as their main reason for moving and about ten percent give one of various other reasons. The consequences of migration seem to have been largely positive: on average, moving increased both migrants' earnings and their social status.

The shares of males and females among migrants and non-migrants are practically identical with a slightly higher percentage of women in the group of people with migration experience, in particular among those who moved before or during 2001. This is, however, likely to result from the higher percentage of females in the group of older people, who of course are more likely to have moved at least once during their lives. Nevertheless, young people seem to be more mobile than the older ones. This is confirmed by the fact that the majority of those who migrated (48.5 percent) from 2002 to 2010 were people under 30.

The migration patterns of the two biggest ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, Kazakhs and Russians, differ considerably. Russians are less likely to change their place of residence: only about 37 percent of them have some migration experience as compared to almost 62 percent of Kazakhs.

A big share of people who moved after 2002 are persons with higher education (44 percent). In terms of employment our data show that recent migrants in Kazakhstan seem to have the same likelihood of being unemployed or out of the labour force as the rest of the population.

A special section of the survey was devoted to the attitudes of respondents towards immigration and immigrants in Kazakhstan. When asked to indicate whether the number of immigrants living in Kazakhstan should be reduced, remain unchanged or should be increased, close to 40 percent of the respondents wish the current number of immigrants to be reduced and a nearly similar proportion prefers their number to remain unchanged. The reduction of immigration is supported by an above-average proportion of lower educated persons, non-migrants, and ethnic Kazakhs. Many individuals associate immigration with a higher incidence of unemployment and decreasing wages. This pattern is also confirmed by our survey. When confronted with the statement "immigrants take jobs away from citizens in Kazakhstan" more than half of the respondents agreed. However, considerable more persons with a lower education (61 percent) were afraid of losing their jobs to immigrants as compared to those with a higher education (45 percent). A defensive attitude prevailed in the context of cultural impacts of immigration. Nearly half of the respondents disagreed (46 percent) with the view that immigrants might improve the society by bringing new ideas and cultures, 20 percent were ambivalent and 9 percent did not know what to answer. While the attitudes of people in European countries are rather similar to those in Kazakhstan with respect to the economic impacts of immigration they are more positive in the cultural sphere.

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