Sergej A. Papkov: Obyknovennyj terror. Politika stalinizma v Sibiri. Moskva: Rosspėn, 2012. 440 S., Abb., Tab. = Istorija Stalinisma. ISBN: 978-5-8243-1674-2

Sergej A. Papkov: Obyknovennyj terror. Politika stalinizma v Sibiri. Moskva: Rosspėn, 2012. 440 S., Abb., Tab. = Istorija Stalinisma. ISBN: 978-5-8243-1674-2.

Stalinism was a regime of political terror. Stalin used terror in various ways and forms with varying degrees of intensity during the nearly three decades of his rule. Sergei Papkov, author of a previously published book, Stalinskii terror v Sibiri 1928–1941 (1997), expands the discussion of Stalin’s terror both chronologically and conceptually. Although he does not explicitly explain the term used in the book title “ordinary terror”, it is clear that his narrative concerns not merely mass killings (which culminated with the Great Terror in 1937–1938) but much more. Various forms of politically motivated coercion, ranging from the forcible taking of grain from peasants to mass deportations and the punishment of workers for tardiness, systematically destroyed the private lives and personal freedom of Soviet citizens and deprived them of their human rights. Stalin’s terror thus assumed the characteristic of “permanent cleansing” (p. 388). With Siberia as his case study, Papkov presents Stalinist society as infused with terror at every level.

Papkov exposes the instrumentality of Stalin’s terror: at each stage Stalin directed terror against a different target using various methods in order to solve political problems and transform Soviet society. At the time of collectivization and de-kulakization in 1930–1933, 40 to 80 percent of kolkhoz households in Siberia had at least one member who had been repressed (that is condemned) (p. 90). This level of persecution among ordinary Soviet citizens was seen again in the early 1940s when tardiness and unauthorized absence from work criminalized workers. Draconian labor laws enacted during the war created an unprecedented degree of criminal persecution against the population as a whole.

The present book’s strength lies in the period from 1945 to 1953 not covered by Papkov’s previous book. During the War, minor disciplinary infractions became criminal offenses. Everything, including industrial labor, was militarized. Consequently, workers were tried by military tribunals en masse. During the war as many as 16 million Soviet citizens were prosecuted for one reason or another (pp. 331 and 413). Although many were amnestied after the War, the post-War years witnessed a new kind of terror. Tens of thousands were deported for so-called “anti-social” or “parasitic” activities to remote areas of the Soviet Union, clearly an effort to bolster the kolkhoz system. Others, lucky enough to have survived the Great Terror of 1937–1938 by being sentenced to the Gulag and exile, were re-arrested after release, by Moscow’s secret orders of 1948. Terror against religious believers was renewed as well. Towards the end of Stalin’s life, Jews were targeted for terror in Siberia as elsewhere in the Soviet Union.

Papkov contends that Stalin’s “ordinary terror” inevitably involved the party and Soviet apparatus. True, both the Communist Party and the Soviet government were terrorized as well, but they were not merely objects of terror but the subjects (executors). By mobilizing the entire apparatus of the party and the government, Papkov states, Stalin’s politics of terror allowed him to accelerate the destruction of the old economic and social order and strengthen the newly created order in its stead. Papkov may be right in concluding his work on this note. This interpretation of the instrumentality of terror is not new and is convincing to an extent. Yet Stalin’s personal role and responsibility are largely missing.

While case studies can be highly revealing, they can also be misleading, or at the least self-limiting. Papkov’s study is no exception. Questions of specificity and commonality are not addressed explicitly. This is somewhat frustrating to those who study other parts of the Soviet Union: what generalizations can or cannot be made? For example, it is possible to demonstrate that the Great Terror hit Siberia particularly harshly. Why? Papkov does not address this in detail. I suggest that one reason for this omission is that Papkov restricts his discussion almost entirely to domestic issues (the economic and social transformation of Soviet society). Stalin did not formulate his policies exclusively within a domestic context. External factors such as international relations leading up to the war need to be integrated more fully into the analysis of terror.

Despite these caveats, the present work on Stalin’s terror is a penetrating analysis and is recommended highly for anyone interested in Stalin’s Soviet Union.

Hiroaki Kuromiya, Indiana University

Zitierweise: Hiroaki Kuromiya über: Sergej A. Papkov: Obyknovennyj terror. Politika stalinizma v Sibiri. Moskva: Rosspėn, 2012. 440 S., Abb., Tab. = Istorija Stalinisma. ISBN: 978-5-8243-1674-2, http://www.dokumente.ios-regensburg.de/JGO/erev/Kuromiya_Papkov_Obyknovennyi_terror.html (Datum des Seitenbesuchs)

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