Mikhail Iur’evich Zenchenko: Južnoe rossijskoe porubež’e v konce XVI – načale XVII v. (opyt gosudarstvennogo stroitel’stva). [The Southern Russian Frontier Region at the End of the Sixteenth and the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century (The Experience of State Construction)]. Moskva: Pamjatniki istoričeskoj mysli, 2008. 223 S. Karte, Bibl. ISBN 978-5-88451-231-3.

In this well-researched monograph Mikhail Iur’evich Zenchenko examines the process by which Muscovy’s southern frontier region was integrated into its state structure, shedding new light on the political, economic and social development of the border zone.

After an introduction surveying Russian-language historiography and sources, Zenchenko presents five chapters dealing with policy toward the southern steppe under Ivan IV, the concept of “popular colonization,” Boris Godunov’s policies, the role of the frontier cities during the uprisings of 1606–1607, and the conversion of these frontier forts into Muscovite “districts” (uezdy), followed by a brief conclusion.

Zenchenko traces later developments in the southern frontier zone to the policies of Ivan IV. The establishment of a system of scouts and lookout posts (storozhevaia i stanichnaia sluzhba) in 1571 was followed by six years of further reform from 1574–1580. Overall Zenchenko questions the usually lauded success of this system, which he thinks deserves little credit for the Muscovite victory over the Crimean Tatars at Molodi in 1572. In 1575 the far outposts (stany) were destroyed. The establishment of the “border command” (ukrainnyi razriad) over the forts south of the Oka River separate from the Oka River defensive line protected Central Muscovy from Crimean raids better than it defended Riazan’. In 1599 the “shore” military service, the mustering of regiments along the Oka River to prevent Crimean incursions, was abolished.

Zenchenko dismisses the notion of “popular colonization” of the southern frontier as a myth. At most peasant settlement supplemented state military colonization. He also makes some interesting remarks on the ability of the Russian peasant with his axe to adapt to the treeless black earth zone without a loan from a monastery or landlord.

Boris Godunov’s failure to protect the southern frontier and to pay the military servitors made the population ripe for pretenders. This was not class warfare but tension between virtually the entire population of the “towns” against the governor appointed in Moscow.

Zenchenko draws distinctions between the older border cities, closer to the settled Muscovite heartland, and the more distant outposts in the steppe itself. He disputes the generalization that the entire region supported the False Dmitriis. Gentry closer to the Oka line united behind the government against the threat to land and order from the Cossacks.

Integration of the frontier had social, economic and administrative aspects. Fortresses whose population consisted of little more than arquebusiers and Cossacks who required food subsidies from central Muscovy to subsist evolved into standard “districts” with landowning gentry and peasants engaged in agriculture. However, gentry corporations of landowners did not develop in the steppe regions of the frontier until the very end of the Time of Troubles, later than is usually assumed, as attested by cadastres. While cities such as Elets, Livny, and Kursk were thoroughly integrated into the Muscovite administrative apparatus as “districts,” more distant Belgorod, Voronezh, Oskol and Valuiki were just beginning to evolve in that direction and were still dominated by Cossacks, not gentry and agricultural peasants.

Zenchenko is adept at debunking some myths widespread in Soviet historiography such as the Troubles as a Peasant War and “popular colonization.” He also at least denies the applicability of the myth of the freedom-loving Cossacks to the Volga Cossacks who lived by brigandage against Russians. Nevertheless he approaches Soviet cliché in blaming neglect of the frontier under Ivan IV to the selfish class interests of the boyars who gave a higher priority to protecting their estates in Central Muscovy than to defending the southern frontier.

Even given his narrow definition of relevant scholarship, Zenchenko’s bibliography lacks some relevant Russian-language publications one would have expected him to cite. It contains two works in Ukrainian, one in Polish, and one in French. Were he familiar with recent English-language scholarship on the Troubles he would have realized that he is less original than he claims.

Zenchenko’s chapters are loosely chronological in sequence but his selective treatment of themes and attention to detail sometimes obscures his main points. Some but not all of his conclusions are more clearly expressed in his conclusion than in his chapters. Sometimes material in the chapters seems unrelated to the chapter titles.

The biggest virtue of the monograph is its sensitivity to geography. The glossy color insert map of the entire region and all its cities is crucial for following Zenchenko’s argument. It enables the reader to ‘see,’ for example, how the new cities followed the Crimean incursion route from Tula to Riazan’. Also attractive is the bibliographic listing by RGADA fond of archival documents individually, and of published documents in chronological order. Finally, formatting slightly indented lengthier quotations from sources in boldface type enhances the presentation. An index would have been helpful.

Zenchenko’s “Iuzhnoe rossiiskoe porubezh’e v kontse XVI – nachale XVII v. (opyt gosudarstvennogo stroitel’stva)” will interest all specialists in Muscovite history.

Charles J. Halperin, Bloomington, IN / USA