Rudolf A. Mark: Krieg an fernen Fronten. Die Deutschen in Zentralasien und am Hindukusch 1914–1924. Paderborn [usw.]: Schöningh, 2013. 285 S., 24 Abb., 2 Ktn., Tab. ISBN: 978-3-506-77788-1

Rudolf A. Mark: Krieg an fernen Fronten. Die Deutschen in Zentralasien und am Hindukusch 1914–1924. Paderborn [usw.]: Schöningh, 2013. 285 S., 24 Abb., 2 Ktn., Tab. ISBN: 978-3-506-77788-1.

World War One or the “Great War” (1914–1918) is one of the most significant events in the recent history of mankind. It is over 100 years since it broke out. Still, numerous volumes on the subject continue to be published, and much hitherto unknown information has come to light. In this interesting book Mark focuses on one of these little known subjects – Germans and German POWs in Central Asia and Hindukush during World War One and in the years following up to 1924 when “Russian Central Asia” was firmly folded into the Soviet Union. Mark uses Hindukush to denote Afghanistan but excludes Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan), focusing on Russian Turkestan or Russian Central Asia. Likewise by “German” Mark includes German-speaking people from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and people of German origin in Central Asia.

Mark argues two critical points. First, the importance of Central Asia and Hindukush for the geopolitical strategy of the German Empire, especially during World War One. Second, the role ethnic Germans and German-speaking POWs in these areas were assigned to play in its implementation. The first issue has recently been argued by other scholars but in this book Mark sheds further light on the subject. In fighting against the Entente powers, Germany naturally turned attention to their weaknesses: in particular Muslim peoples of Russia’s Central Asia and Hindukush (as well as the Middle East) whose aspirations for freedom from the Entente powers Germany wanted to use to advance its own geopolitical interests. If Germany could buy the hearts and minds of these Muslims, the Entente would become weaker and Germany finally would emerge as a power comparable to Britain, France, and Russia. Germany thus wanted to “revolutionize the Islamic lands of our enemies” (p. 22) or help organize a “Jihad” against the Entente powers. For this purpose, the Oriental Information Office (Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient) was created in the Foreign Ministry soon after the breakout of the war.

One of the most important operations came to be known as the Niedermayer-Hentig expedition to Afghanistan in 1915 and 1916 (so named after Oskar Ritter von Nidermayer [1885–1948], military intelligence officer, and Werner Otto von Hentig [1886–1984], a diplomat, who led the mission). They were accompanied by two Indian revolutionaries, Maulana Barkatullah and Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh (pp. 110–111). Afghan Emir Habibullah was a shrewd politician. While he signed an Afghan-German friendship treaty, he skillfully avoided making any commitment to invading India and maintained neutrality. The German mission ultimately failed. The German calculations had included utilizing numerous Germans POWs held in Russian Central Asia for its purposes. There were tens of thousands of German and Hungarian POWs there (some 90,000 in 1916 and 32,000 in 1917 [pp. 57, 72, 91]. Some of them had fled to Afghanistan. The Niedermayer-Hentig scheme had planned to use them for Indian campaigns, which did not materialize, however.

Nor did Germany’s scheme against Russia succeed. Russia, like Britain, considered German diplomats and merchants as dangerous agents and closely watched their activity and took appropriate counter-measures. Almost certainly Germany played no role in the famous Central Asian rebellions against the tsarist government in 1916, although locals did hope for a German attack on Russian Turkestan. The Russian government made every effort to emphasize the alleged political disloyalty of ethnic Germans to the tsarist government and the alleged existence of a well-organized network of German secret agents consisting of Volksdeutsche and German POWs.

The fall of the tsarist government and the rise of Soviet power changed the dynamic of the situation. There was a real possibility of Russian Turkestan being emancipated from Russian control. Yet there was no consensus among the German policy makers on whether or not to support the Islamic movements (pan-Turkic, pan-Islamic, and other anti-colonial movements). Some feared that an independent Turkestan might become an English, rather than a Russian, domain. In any case, Germany’s defeat in World War One in 1918 rendered the question moot for the time being. Meanwhile, many German POWs in Central Asia, influenced by Communism, helped to establish Soviet power there.

Mark concludes plausibly that the German failure was due largely to the fact that the resources of Germany (especially expertise on these parts of the world) were incommensurate with its ambitious political plans. Mark notes that Germany’s interests in Central Asia and Hindukush did not disappear, adding that Central Asia, however, played no role in the German expansion plan during World War Two.

In placing the German experience during World War One within a wider context, Mark could have done a little more. He does not discuss Germany’s ambitions in Afghanistan in the 1930s. Nor does he discuss the fate of those German POWs turned Communists who stayed on in the Soviet Union. The majority of them are likely to have been arrested as German spies in 1937–38.

Hiroaki Kuromiya, Indiana University, Bloomington