Helmut Altrichter Russland 1989. Der Untergang des sowjetischen Imperiums. Verlag C.H. Beck München 2009. ISBN: 978-3-406-58266-0

Helmut Altrichter: Russland 1989. Der Untergang des sowjetischen Imperiums. München: Beck, 2009. 448 S., 9 Abb. ISBN: 978-3-406-58266-0.

In modern European history certain years are associated with vast popular emancipatory movements. In this respect 1989 was a worthy successor to 1848. The old order rapidly tumbled, but many of the hopes engendered soon turned out to be illusory. Nevertheless in today’s Eastern Europe even the most authoritarian regimes have to pay lip service to democratic principles and the rule of law.

In his latest volume Helmut Altrichter offers a gripping and persuasive chronicle of the events in that tumultuous year, focussing on the USSR but paying due attention to the international context. In the centre, naturally enough, stands the still enigmatic figure of Mikhail Gorbachev. The reformist General Secretary of the CPSU skilfully manipulated the levers of power to bring about a shift in the locus of authority that fatally undermined his own supremacy, while concealing his ulterior intentions behind a screen of benevolent rhetoric. If he offered no credible definition of glasnost’ or perestroika, this was because he himself was unsure how far to go. Sticking to familiar concepts such as the Party’s ‘leading role’, he fostered policies that implied acceptance of European-style social democracy. The once sacrosanct planned economy, now decried as the ‘administrative-command system’, stood condemned, yet only hesitant steps were taken towards a free market.

The key institutional innovation was the Congress of People’s Deputies, which began its deliberations on 25 May. Some 2,500 delegates were in attendance. This raucous and often chaotic assembly somewhat resembled the soviet congresses of 1917, but as Altrichter makes clear the organizers managed to ensure that it performed its chief task, to elect a reformed Supreme Soviet, of which Gorbachev became chairman, uneasily combining this job with that of Party boss. What the leader failed to foresee was the shattering impact that televised broadcasting of the proceedings would have on public opinion. “Already after the first day […] the Soviet Union was no longer the same.” (p. 169) One after another taboos were broken as the harsh light of truth was brought to bear: ecological catastrophes, the implications of the Nazi-Soviet pact, bureaucratic malpractices past and present … These scandalous revelations inexorably undercut the Party’s claim to be an infallible guide towards a prosperous future. The point was forcibly made by a handful of progressive deputies, organized in an ‘Inter-Regional Group’, supported by burgeoning civic organizations such as Memorial. Despite the euphoria which these bodies induced they lacked solid popular roots, as became clear once they came under attack by left-conservatives with different views of what perestroika entailed.

Altrichter, who was in Moscow at the time, succeeds in conveying the excitement of these months. In Part II he goes on to examine the way the state order was brought to the verge of collapse by economic woes and the vociferous claims of the national minorities. The amount of currency in circulation that year rose by 18.4 per cent; 10.9 per cent of GNP was spent in subsidizing consumption; yet in the shops goods were scarcer than ever and even grain had to be imported. This strained the budget further since owing to international price fluctuations oil and gas exports brought in less than before (or later). The picture of the crisis given here is somewhat impressionistic (neither of the above statistics merits inclusion), but depicts well enough how it was perceived by contemporaries, who now had the means to voice their frustration. The black market flourished, as did the mafia. Strikes by miners in several regions were the most visible expression of discontent. They get ample coverage here, and the author notes justly that “the miners were under no illusion that all would be well if the pits were granted autonomy, since […] they had lost belief in radical reform.” (p. 269)

In the non-Russian republics conflict was most acute in Transcaucasia, as Armenians and Azeris squabbled over the enclave of Nagornyi Karabakh, but there was violence in Central Asia, too. Everywhere local leaders wanted greater rights to run their affairs, but only in the Baltic was independence the principal aim. Memories of past injustices – forcible annexation in 1940 and the subsequent deportations – fuelled the secessionist national fronts. Particularly threatening to Moscow’s control was the decision by several local Party chiefs to throw in their lot with the people’s representatives. By year’s end the three Baltic nations enjoyed a precarious de facto sovereignty.

In the third part of the work we move on to foreign affairs. In each of the Warsaw Pact (WTO) states the situation differed, though there were underlying similarities. Thus Poland led in developing a nationwide civic organization, whereas Romania lagged, enduring tyrannical rule longest – and ending it most violently. (No consideration is given to Albania.) Altrichter makes good use of the SED archives, which contain notably records of the WTO’s Political Consultative Commission. It was at a meeting of this body in July that Gorbachev intimated that he had abandoned the Brezhnev doctine. Its demise was however not made public, so that eastern European civic leaders had reason to fear another Prague-style intervention to uphold the status quo. “No one imagined the Soviet leadership’s self-imposed restraint would be put to the test so soon.” (p. 334)

Perhaps Gorbachev’s greatest success was in his impact on Western opinion. But the notion of a ‘common European home’ was too idealistic to win consent, and unilateral concessions, notably over nuclear disarmament, weakened the USSR without securing a corresponding quid pro quo, so that ultimately the West got the best of the bargain. Russia has yet to come to terms with this outcome. It was largely attributable to the fact that millions of men and women at grass-roots level acted much more effectively than they had done in 1848.

Of this great revolution Altrichter offers a definitive account: sober, sympathetic, and immensely detailed. He can scarcely be faulted on a point of fact. Yet his strength lies in narrative. One cries out for more analysis: of the various options available to policy-makers and of the ambivalence that characterized many popular movements. How important was outside pressure in inducing change? How genuine was the drive for, say, Abkhazian autonomy from Georgia (the latter thought it faked by Moscow). Why cite without comment an estimate of casualties in the Ukrainian famine of 1932–1934 that is twice as high as today’s consensus figure, reached after thorough research? And above all why did Gorbachev persist in his reformist course when it was clear that things were going badly wrong?

The author might fairly respond that hindsight distorts posterity’s judgements. What he has given us is a panorama of events as they were lived through at the time. For this we should be grateful, since memories of 1989 are already fading and we should not let ourselves fall prey to the myth-makers.

John Keep, Bern